S. R. Gardiner, *History of England,* 10 vols (1884), vol. ix (1639-41), vol. x (1641-·2).
Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart England (1485-1714)

English Civil war
Part I

English Civil Wars, also called **Great Rebellion**, (1642–51), fighting that took place in the British Isles between supporters of the monarchy of Charles I(and his son and successor, Charles II) and opposing groups in each of Charles's kingdoms, including Parliamentarians in England, Covenanters in Scotland, and Confederates in Ireland. The English Civil Wars are traditionally considered to have begun in England in August 1642.

The wars finally ended in 1651 with the flight of Charles II to France and, with him, the hopes of the British monarchy.

Background

When James I died he was succeeded by his son King Charles I at the age of 24.
The initial relationship between the king and the Parliament was expected to be harmonious.

The first conflict in the relationship began in the context of the war with Spain. At the beginning of a new reign it had long been the practice for Parliament to vote the sovereign the Customs duties – Tonnage and Poundage – for life. These duties formed a substantial part of the **royal revenue** and would be **essential** now that **war was imminent**. But Tonnage and Poundage were not the only levies on trade. There were also Impositions, which the Commons continued to regard as illegal. Tonnage and Poundage, in short, were too valuable a bargaining counter for the Commons to grant them unconditionally. The Commons therefore granted Tonnage and Poundage for one year only. The Lords were affronted by the breach of precedent implied in a one-year grant and threw out the Commons' bill. As a consequence, Charles was deprived of a vital part of his revenue just as he was about to spend great sums of money on a war that Parliament, in 1621 and 1624, had passionately advocated. This meant that, for the immediate future, the Customs duties would be based on the same prerogative authority as the hated Impositions. The king demanded additional subsidies but it was turned down by the Commons leading to the disbandment of the Parliament. In the meantime attack on Cadiz proved to be futile and ended in discrediting Buckingham, the King's chief advisor.

Tonnage and poundage, customs duties granted since medieval times to the English crown by Parliament. Tonnage was a fixed subsidy on each tun (cask) of wine imported, and poundage was an *advalorem* (proportional) tax on all imported and exported goods. Though of separate origin, they were granted together from 1373 and were used for the protection of trade at sea. From 1414 they were customarily granted for life to each successive king.
Prior to the English Civil Wars (1642–51), their collection became an important issue in the constitutional struggle between Charles I and Parliament.

The King was so short of money that he had no option but to summon **another Parliament**, and this met in **February 1626**. Charles declared his willingness to redress the Commons' grievances on condition that they acted responsibly by voting supply, without which the war could not be waged. If not, he warned them 'that Parliaments are altogether in my power for

their calling, sitting and dissolution. Therefore, as I find the fruits of them good or evil they are to continue, or not, to be'.

The Commons' reply took the form of a **remonstrance**, drawn up at John Eliot's suggestion. The King kept Parliament in session for a little longer, in the hope that it would eventually vote supply, but although the Commons had decided in principle on a grant of three subsidies and fifteenths, they would not complete the passage of the subsidy bill until their grievances had been redressed. In June 1626, therefore, Charles dissolved his second Parliament.

In the meantime, **English attack was directed against France**, for relations between the two countries had deteriorated as the result of an uprising by the French protestants, the Huguenots. Cardinal Richelieu was by now Louis XIII's chief minister. Richelieu opted for an alliance with Spain on the grounds that France could not engage in foreign ventures while being torn by internal dissent. Buckingham decided to intervene on the Huguenots' behalf in the hope that they would help either to topple Richelieu or force him to revert to his former policy. But the venture in Re proved to be failure and the news of this latest defeat provoked an angry reaction in England.

The plight of La Rochelle which was the Huguenot stronghold was now desperate, for Richelieu had invested it from both land and sea and was determined to starve its inhabitants into surrender. Only England could prevent the collapse of Huguenot resistance, but if another expedition was to be mounted money would somehow have to be found. Buckingham and other Councillors argued that the only solution lay in Parliament, and Charles reluctantly agreed.

Meanwhile, Parliament had assembled, in March 1628 Coke's proposal was quickly adopted, and after numerous conferences with the Lords, the ***Petition of Right*** was formally drawn up and presented to the King. It requested that non-parliamentary taxation, imprisonment without cause shown, the billeting of troops and the imposition of martial law should be declared illegal. The assassination of the Duke was expected to open the way to more harmonious relations between him and Parliament. King summoned the two Houses to reassemble in January 1629. In order to remove one of the outstanding bones of contention between him and the Commons, he ordered Sir John Coke to put before the House a draft bill on Tonnage and Poundage, with the request that members would give it priority.

However, the Commons were more concerned with the growth of **Arminianism**, (a liberal form of Calvinism begun by Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminus) as a result in the 1629 session religion became for the first time a major cause of controversy. One of the reasons for this was uncertainty about the exact nature of the established Church, particularly since the Arminians insisted that they were the true guardians of its traditions. No sooner did the session start than the Parliament passed a resolution confirming the *Thirty-Nine Articles* only as these had been expounded by 'the public acts of the Church of England' and rejecting 'the sense of the Jesuits, Arminians and all other wherein they differ from it'.

Thirty-nine Articles, the **doctrinal statement** of the Church of England. With the Book of Common Prayer, they present the liturgy and **doctrine** of that church. The Thirty-nine Articles developed from **the Forty-two Articles**, written by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer in 1553 "for the avoiding of controversy in opinions." These had been partly derived from the Thirteen Articles of 1538, designed as the basis of an agreement between Henry VIII and

the German Lutheran princes, which had been influenced by the Lutheran Augsburg Confession (1530).
The Forty-two Articles were eliminated when Mary I became queen (1553) and restored Roman Catholicism. After Elizabeth I became queen (1558), a new statement of doctrine was needed. In 1563 the Canterbury Convocation (the periodic assembly of clergy of the province of Canterbury) drastically revised the Forty-two Articles, and additional changes were made at Elizabeth's request. A final revision by convocation in 1571 produced the Thirty-nine Articles, which were approved by both convocation and Parliament.

So when the Commons at last turned their attention to Tonnage and Poundage they demonstrated that they were in no mood to be conciliatory. The Commons was at this stage led by Sir John Eliot, Denzil Holles and Benjamin Valentine. The Commons decided to draw up a remonstrance against the continued collection of Tonnage and Poundage, as well as one against Arminianism. Charles realised there was no point in continuing with the session, and in March 1629 he announced an adjournment, widely (and correctly) seen as a prelude to dissolution. Charles never recalled this Parliament. As for the men who had led the Commons in this violent act of disobedience, Eliot, Valentine and Holles were tried in King's Bench and sentenced to be imprisoned. For the next eleven years Charles ruled England without a Parliament.

Eleven years rule

The personal rule of Charles I became distinctive because of the rise of William Laud and his ecclesiastical reforms and the imposition of new taxes in the absence of the Parliament. The closing years of James's reign had infact seen the Arminians strengthen their position One of the leading figures among the Arminians by the 1620s was William Laud who went on to become the Archbishop of Canterbury.

It was the ecclesiastical reforms undertaken by Charles's close adviser William Laud, **the archbishop of Canterbury**, and with the conspicuous role assumed in these reforms by Henrietta Maria, Charles's Catholic queen, and her courtiers, many in England became alarmed. New taxes were out of the question, for the English were notoriously resistant to taxation at the best of times, and in the absence of Parliament Charles had to make sure he kept within the bounds of law. That is why his advisers resurrected old measures that had at least a tincture of legality rather than adopting new ones.

1. The first device was Distraint of Knighthood. All men with land worth £40 a year were under a legal obligation to take up knighthood, but rapid inflation during the sixteenth century pushed many people into this category who were below the social level of knights and had no desire to take up an honour

2. Entire counties, such as Essex and Northamptonshire, were now declared subject to the forest law, and hundreds of people were prosecuted for breaches of the law who did not even know they were subject to it.

3. The most notorious of all the financial devices of the Personal Rule was Ship Money. It had long been accepted that, in times of emergency, the ports and coastal regions should provide ships for the defence of the kingdom – or, if they had no ships available, money in lieu.

Ship money, was revived as a general tax by Charles I aroused widespread opposition.

The first of six annual writs appeared in October 1634 and differed from traditional levies in that it was based on the possibility of war rather than immediate national emergency. The writ of the following year increased the imposition and extended it to inland towns. The issue of a third writ in 1636 made it evident that Charles intended ship money as a permanent and general form of taxation. Each succeeding writ aroused greater popular discontent and opposition, and upon the issue of the third writ John Hampden, a prominent parliamentarian, refused payment.

In terms of their effect on public opinion the financial expedients of the Personal Rule were disastrous, but they did at least expand the royal revenue.

The Scottish wars

However, it was Charles's attempt in 1637 to introduce a modified version of the English Book of Common Prayer that provoked a wave of riots in Scotland, beginning at the Church of St. Giles in Edinburgh. A National Covenant calling for immediate withdrawal of the prayer book was speedily drawn up on February 28, 1638. Despite its moderate tone and conservative format, the National Covenant was a radical manifesto against the Personal Rule of Charles I that justified a revolt against the interfering sovereign.

The turn of events in Scotland horrified Charles, who determined to bring the rebellious Scots to heel. War broke out. However, the Covenanters, as the Scottish rebels became known, quickly overwhelmed the poorly trained English army, forcing the king to sign a peace treaty at Berwick (June 18, 1639). Though the Covenanters had won the first Bishops' War, Charles refused to concede victory and called an English parliament, seeing it as the only way to raise money quickly. Parliament assembled in **April 1640,** but it lasted only **three weeks** (and hence became known as the **Short Parliament**). The House of Commons was willing to vote the huge sums that the king needed to finance his war against the Scots, but not until their grievances—some dating back more than a decade—had been redressed. Furious, Charles precipitately **dissolved the Short Parliament**. As a result, it was an untrained, ill-armed, and poorly paid force that trailed north to fight the Scots in the second Bishops' War. On August 20, 1640, the Covenanters invaded England for the second time, and in a spectacular military campaign they took Newcastle following the Battle of Newburn (August 28). Demoralized and humiliated, the king had no alternative but to negotiate and, at the insistence of the Scots, to recall parliament.

A new parliament (the Long Parliament), which no one dreamed would sit for the next 20 years, assembled at Westminster on November 3, 1640, and immediately called for the impeachment of Wentworth, who by now was the earl of Strafford. The lengthy trial at Westminster, ending with Strafford's execution on May 12, 1641, was orchestrated by Protestants and Catholics from Ireland, by Scottish Covenanters, and by the king's English opponents, especially the leader of Commons, John Pym.

In **early November 1641** the news reached London that the **Irish catholics had risen in revolt against the protestant English settlers** and were massacring them. Pym could have asked for no more graphic proof of his belief in the existence of a popish conspiracy. The need to win over a majority of members of Parliament prompted Pym to transform his remonstrance into the *Grand Remonstrance*, a document of more than two hundred clauses

listing all the grievances under which the country had groaned during the Personal Rule. With 159 members voting in favour of the *Remonstrance*, and 148 voting against, a majority of eleven was achieved.

In December 1641 a petition said to represent the views of hundreds of London citizens, and calling for the abolition of episcopacy 'with all its dependencies, roots and branches', was presented to the Commons. The Root and Branch Petition overlapped with another measure the Commons were considering, aimed at depriving the bishops of their votes in the House of Lords. This would have weakened Charles's position there, since the bishops were among his most committed supporters, and in January 1641 he had summoned the two Houses before him and warned them not to go along this route.

While Charles was making these gestures of reconciliation he was preparing a *coup d'état* against the militants, for he shared Pym's belief in the existence of a conspiracy members of the Commons – John Pym, John Hampden, Arthur Hazelrig, Denzil Holles and William Strode – of high treason. The Five Members, who had been warned of Charles's plan by friends at court, had taken refuge with puritan radicals in the City. Charles drove in to the City and called on the Common Council to hand over the fugitives so that they might stand trial, but the citizens would not abandon their heroes, and angry crowds surged round the King's carriage. Charles and his family left for Hampton Court while the five members returned to London Triumphant.

Charles, who was trying to restore his own credibility after the Five Members' incident, agreed in principle that Parliament should **nominate the Lord Lieutenants** as long as their commissions ran in his name and could be revoked when he saw fit. But Pym and the majority in the Commons were determined not to compromise on the vital question of who should control the trained bands, and the two Houses therefore issued their **bill as the Militia Ordinance**, to which they demanded obedience from all the King's subjects. The king refused to give up the **rights of appointing the Lord Lieutenants**. While Charles was ready for a war the members of the two houses were ready for a reconciliation. On **June 1642, they sent to him the 19 propositions.** These contained demands that Parliament should control appointments to the principal military and civil offices; that 'no public act . . . may be esteemed of any validity, as proceeding from royal authority, unless it be done by the advice and consent of the major part of your Council, attested under their hands'; and that 'such a reformation be made of the Church government and liturgy as both Houses of Parliament shall advise'.

These were terms that, as the parliamentary leaders knew full well, Charles would never accept. **In fact, he regarded the *Nineteen Propositions* as clear proof that they were not interested in a negotiated settlement**. Since they had taken over control of the Lieutenancy through the Militia Ordinance – which he denounced as illegal – he reverted to the pre-Lieutenancy device of issuing Commissions of Array. These were directed to named individuals in every county and major city, and instructed them to raise forces on the King's behalf. The commissions were sent out in June 1642; in July the King's recruiting campaign got under way; and on 22 August Charles raised the royal standard at Nottingham. It was a call to arms, for civil war was now inevitable.

The first major battle fought on English soil—the Battle of Edgehill (October 1642)—quickly demonstrated that a clear advantage was enjoyed by neither the Royalists (also known as

the Cavaliers) nor the Parliamentarians (also known as the Roundheads for their short-cropped hair, in contrast to the long hair and wigs associated with the Cavaliers). Although recruiting, equipping, and supplying their armies initially proved problematic for both sides, by the end of 1642 each had armies of between 60,000 and 70,000 men in the field. However, sieges and skirmishes—rather than pitched battles—dominated the military landscape in England during the first Civil War, as local garrisons, determined to destroy the economic basis of their opponents while preserving their own resources, scrambled for territory. Charles, with his headquarters in Oxford, enjoyed support in the north and west of England, in Wales, and (after 1643) in Ireland. Parliament controlled the much wealthier areas in the south and east of England together with most of the key ports and, critically, London, the financial capital of the kingdom. In order to win the war, Charles needed to capture London, and this was something that he consistently failed to do.

Yet Charles prevented the Parliamentarians from smashing his main field army. The result was an effective military stalemate until the triumph of the Roundheads at the Battle of Marston Moor (July 2, 1644). This decisive victory deprived the king of two field armies and, equally important, paved the way for the reform of the parliamentary armies with the creation of the New Model Army, completed in April 1645. Thus, by 1645 Parliament had created a centralized standing army, with central funding and central direction. The New Model Army now moved against the Royalist forces. Their closely fought victory at the Battle of Naseby (June 14, 1645) proved the turning point in parliamentary fortunes and marked the beginning of a string of stunning successes—Langport (July 10), Rowton Heath (September 24), and Annan Moor (October 21)—that eventually forced the king to surrender to the Scots at Newark on May 5, 1646.

DEBATE ON THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR

Whigs and Marxists such as Lawrence Stone and Christopher Hill, saw the upheavals of the 1640s and 1650s as constituting the first “Great Revolution” in world history. According to Hill, the English Revolution of 1640-60 was a great social movement like the French Revolution of 1789. The state power protecting an old order that was essentially feudal was violently overthrown, power passed into the hands of a new class, and so the freer development of capitalism was made possible. The Civil War was a class war, in which the despotism of Charles I was defended by the reactionary forces of the established Church and conservative landlords. Parliament beat the King because it could appeal to the enthusiastic support of the trading and industrial classes in town and countryside, to the yeomen and progressive gentry, and to wider masses of the population whenever they were able by free discussion to understand what the struggle was really about.

Revisionism began as a reaction against Whig and Marxist interpretations of the early Stuart period, still highly influential in the 1960s and early 1970s, and most famously exemplified by the work of Stone and Hill. Revisionists were particularly dissatisfied with the inherent teleology imbedded in Whig and Marxist accounts, which saw the English revolution as inevitable, even predictable, and thus as having deep-seated, long-term causes, which it was the historian’s task to unravel. To Revisionists, this was reading history backward. No one in the 1620s or 1630s knew civil war was going to break out in 1642 or acted as if they wanted that to happen. Instead, Revisionists insisted we should judge the early Stuart period on its own terms, without the vantage of hindsight; if we did so, they proposed, we would see that there was no high road to civil war and that it was far from inevitable that the early Stuart

polity would fail. We therefore needed short-term rather than long-term explanations of the English civil war; revolution, they claimed, was the result, not the cause, of civil war.[6]

Geoffrey Elton made the first significant Revisionist intervention back in 1965. The other noted revisionist historians were John Morrill, *The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630–1650* ; Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War: The Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford, 1987–1988* (Oxford, 1990)..

Some Revisionists like Kevin Sharpe, tended to see factional infighting as more important than ideological disagreements. "Faction at the Early Stuart Court," *History Today* 33 (October 1983): 39–46. Others like John Morrill posited that if there were divisions over issues of principle, they were over religion, not the constitution, and even then only a minority of hardliners saw themselves as fighting for a cause.

Because the class interpretation had become so tied up with the debate over the gentry—whether or not they were a new capitalist class rising at the expense of the old feudal aristocracy—scholars began studying the gentry in their local environment; hence, the rise of the county community school. The county community approach came to be associated with Revisionism because of John Morrill's highly influential *Revolt of the Provinces* of 1976,

Revisionist scholarship also tended to focus on the elite—"the people who count," This was in part a reaction against the Marxism of the likes of Hill and Brian Manning (who worked on the English people and the English Revolution) The focus on the elite was also symptomatic of a belief that only a return to high political narrative could explain why things began to go wrong with the early Stuart polity. Thus Revisionists who worked on central politics tended to focus on the king, the court, and Parliament, while those who undertook local studies focused on the gentry.

Finally, Revisionists tended to privilege manuscript sources over printed ones. Again, this began as a reaction against Hill and Manning, whom Revisionists criticized for misusing pamphlet materials and for having undertaken limited archival research

Tim Harris takes what he calls the post-Revisionist position. On a loose definition, it might seem to refer to any work done since Revisionism's heyday and thus to include scholarship that is critical of Revisionism. Asking the next question, as taking Revisionism to the next level, rather than rejecting it outright. According to this view that there was no high road to civil war, no long-term ideological or class conflict, that the early Stuart polity (despite obvious tensions and weak spots) remained viable.

The vast majority of people in early Stuart England would have agreed that monarchs ruled by divine right and were absolute: absolute both in the sense that their power was complete (meaning they did not share their sovereignty with anybody else, such as the pope, or Parliament) and in the sense that they could not be held accountable by their subjects but were above the law. Nevertheless the king, although absolute and above the law, was supposed to rule according to law and to work through Parliament. People disagreed about what this meant in practice—that is why there was so much trouble— but people (in England) were not arguing over the relative merits of two very different systems. Only when things began to go seriously wrong did some start to question the system itself, although that happened quite late.

2. Much of the ideological conflict that occurred under the early Stuarts arose out of practical disputes, most obviously over royal finances. Thus ideological conflict emerged out of a shared belief in the system the English had.

The arguments over the forced loan and about ship money were more about what the system allowed the king to do, as an absolute monarch obliged to rule according to law, than about whether the system itself was right in the first place. That was certainly how opponents of the forced loan and of ship money saw it, and why the 1628 Parliament drew up the Petition of Right condemning forced loans and the Long Parliament in 1641 enacted legislation declaring ship money to have been unlawful. So there certainly was ideological conflict and even struggles over the constitution.

However, it was not so much the rival ideologies that led to the conflict. It was not quite that people were already signed up to rival party platforms and went out to do battle with each other, or that members of the House of Commons were bent on seizing the initiative in government from the Crown, or that the capitalist gentry were seeking to supplant the previous dominance of a supposedly declining feudal aristocracy. Rather, conflict led to the articulation of rival ideological positions.

One could make the case, then, that people were arguing within the system, rather than for or against it. What we see when things start to go wrong under the early Stuarts is a working-through of the implications of a system where there is a divinely ordained, irresistible monarch who is nevertheless obliged to rule according to law and for the public good. This system could be interpreted in different ways, and as conflict emerged, we see the articulation of quite distinct ideological perspectives. The conflict, however, was over making the system work. It was not over breaking the system

People’s concerns under the early Stuarts were less about whether the system was right than about whether the system was being allowed to function properly: hence the concern over extended periods of rule without Parliament (this is why so many people thought Parliament should be recalled to resolve the legality of ship money), over whether ministers of the Crown could be held accountable to law, and over how the king’s judges were interpreting the law.

3. Revisionists tended to concentrate on the elite. Most seventeenth-century historians would now agree that we can no longer do this. To be fair, there were always scholars who believed that politics had a much greater social depth than the Revisionists seemed to allow.

It was social and local historians who definitively demonstrated that the early modern English political system was more participatory than we had once thought

The first major intervention here came from Valerie Pearl, who in the late 1970s and early 1980s published a couple of articles documenting just how widespread officeholding was in Stuart London: according to her findings, perhaps one in ten householders held annually some form of local office. Around the same time, historians of crime were beginning to show how extensive popular participation was in the seventeenth-century English legal system.

The implications of this research were far-reaching. It highlighted the extent to which those in positions of authority at the center, if they were to rule effectively, needed to maintain the support of people in the localities—and a much wider range of people than we had hitherto

realized. It was not just that "the people" were feared lest they might riot or rise in rebellion, although there was certainly that fear, since the people obviously did riot and rebel during this time period. It was also that the government could not enforce the law against political and religious dissidents, could not collect taxes or other levies effectively, could not carry out its desired reforms in the Church—in short, could not govern properly—unless it had the backing of local officeholders, churchwardens, constables, trial jurors, and so forth.

We have seen that early Stuart England was not quite the ideologically polarized world imagined by earlier Whigs and Marxists. Most political actors agreed that the political system they had was the one they wanted to make work. Yet this did not mean there was no ideological conflict. There was quite a bit of it. Issues of principle were important. Parliament was important. Whether the government was doing the right thing— in Church or state—was a source of contention. And more people were concerned about these issues—and more people counted—than Revisionists seemed to allow.

This controversy has centered on two interrelated questions: what actually constitutes a cause, and how viable was the early Stuart regime over the longer term? Those historians who advocated longer-term explanations always stressed the importance of short-term triggers, but they believed that the regime was ultimately dysfunctional, or that there were so many political, religious, and economic tensions in Tudor and early Stuart England that some major upheaval, or revolution, was bound eventually to come. Proponents of short-term causes, by contrast, can hold differing opinions about the health of the early Stuart polity. Some would agree that this regime had serious problems, that it contained many contradictions and inner tensions, but nevertheless insist that until that trigger, or those triggers, came the regime was in no danger of collapsing. These triggers might be "accidental" (a tactical military mistake, such as trying to defend indefensible ground at Newburn in 1640) or "contingent" and "external" (such as the prior revolts in Scotland and Ireland). Others, however, have taken the view that the regime was relatively healthy, or else addressing problems in a constructive way, so that if the triggers had not come, the Caroline monarchy in England could have been successful over the longer term. (The **Caroline** era refers to the period in **English** and Scottish history named for the twenty-four-year reign of Charles I (1625–1649), Carolus being Latin for Charles.)

Immediate cause

Short term cause- We could follow Russell and say that one of the causes of the English civil war was the failure of the English to defeat the Scots at the battle of Newburn. If the English had won, Charles I would not have been forced to call the Long Parliament, and the civil war would never have happened. This is insufficient as an historical explanation,

Charles's personal rule. Was this regime really viable over the longer term? One could hardly say that Charles put in place a viable system of royal finance. Nor did he develop satisfactory solutions to the religious and socioeconomic problems bedevilling the realm. Nor did his reforms of the militia do much to enhance the security of the state, as defeat in the Bishops' Wars proved.

The regime was not in a healthy enough condition to cope with a rebellion in Scotland, even though England had five times the population of Scotland and twelve times the wealth. The Scottish and Irish revolts were reactions to self-consciously Britannic policies pursued by the British Crown since the beginning of James I's reign.

Both the Scottish Covenanters and the Irish insurgents saw their grievances as long term. Archibald Johnston of Wariston, the Scottish lawyer who framed the Scottish Covenant, traced Scotland's problems back to just before James VI acceded to the English throne as James I, and then to the policies James had advanced after becoming king of England: first the revival of prelacy and later the imposition of English-style ceremonies on the Scottish Kirk. Likewise, grievances in Ireland went back to the early years of James I's reign—particularly to the policy of plantation pursued in Ulster (and extended elsewhere) following the flight of the earls in 1607. The Irish rebels of 1641 were rejecting the Stuart vision of how Ireland should be ruled.

The quest to understand why civil war broke out in England in 1642 necessitates exploring the longer term. This does not necessarily mean returning to Stone or to Hill, but it does mean our accounts of the origins of the civil war cannot start in 1640, or 1637, or even 1625.

Evaluating the causes of the English Civil War los